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Abstract 
The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical name space that enables the 
assignment of unique, mnemonic identifiers to Internet hosts and the consistent mapping 
of these names to IP addresses. The root of the domain name system is the top of the 
hierarchy and is currently managed by a quasi-private centralized regulatory authority, 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This paper 
identifies and discusses the economic and policy issues raised by competing DNS roots. 
The paper provides a precise definition of root-competition and shows that multiple roots 
are a species of standards competition, in which network externalities play a major role. 
The paper performs a structural analysis of the different forms that competing DNS roots 
can take and their effects on end-user compatibility. It then explores the policy 
implications of the various forms of competition.  
 
The thesis of the paper is that root competition is caused by a severe disjunction between 
the demand for and supply of top-level domain names. ICANN has authorized a tiny 
number of new top-level domains (7) and subjected their operators to excruciatingly slow 
and expensive contractual negotiations. The growth of alternate DNS roots is an attempt 
to bypass that bottleneck. The paper arrives at the policy conclusion that competition 
among DNS roots should be permitted and is a healthy outlet for inefficiency or abuses of 
power by the dominant root administrator. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
Three years after the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), management of the Domain Name System (DNS) continues to 
generate controversy. One of the most intense and significant policy controversies 
associated with ICANN is the problem of competing DNS roots. Within Internet circles, 
the problem of competing roots has taken on the characteristics of a religious war. 
Internet “Catholics,” a collection of veteran techies acknowledging Vint Cerf as their 
Pope and the late Jon Postel as the Messiah, demand allegiance to The One True 
Universal Root. [IAB, 2000; Lynn, 2001] Internet Protestants, with elected ICANN 
Board member Karl Auerbach assuming the role of Luther, insist on the freedom to 
create alternate roots – but just as Luther’s challenge led to the proliferation of hundreds 
of sects and denominations, so (some fear) will the proliferation of DNS roots fragment 
the Internet. 
 
My goal in this paper is to identify and discuss the economic and policy issues raised by 
competing DNS roots. I begin with the observation that multiple roots are a species of 
standards competition, in which network externalities play a huge role. I then perform a 
structural analysis of the different forms competition among DNS roots can take, and 
analyze their compatibility effects and policy implications.   
 
In the established domain name market, the value that can be added by competing DNS 
roots seems to be small relative to the compatibility and fragmentation risks.1 So why are 
we getting competing DNS roots? The answer is clear: root competition is caused by 
ICANN’s extremely restrictive and slow addition of new top-level domains to the domain 
name system. There are no technical constraints preventing the addition of thousands of 
new top-level names to the DNS root. There are many willing suppliers of new top-level 
domains, and many members of the public are willing to pay to register them. The 
ICANN regime, however, has deliberately maintained an extreme scarcity in the supply 
of top-level domain names. It has authorized a tiny number of new top-level domains (7) 
and subjected their operators to excruciatingly slow and expensive contractual 
negotiations. The growth of alternate DNS roots is an attempt to bypass that bottleneck. 
 
More fundamentally, competing roots are about competing sources of authority over the 
Internet. The basic issue they raise is: Should the direction of the DNS market be driven 
by technology and the market, or by a quasi-governmental collective action via ICANN?  
 
The policy conclusion I draw is that competition among DNS roots should be permitted 
and is a healthy outlet for inefficiency or abuses of power by the dominant root. Such 
competition does not threaten the universality of the Internet interconnection, because 
                                                 
1 The domain name registration market is valued at about US$ 2 billion annually. For the ordinary business 
or nonprofit organization holding one or two domain names, the cost of the domain name ($20-50 per year) 
is extremely small compared to the other costs associated with an Internet presence (servers, labor, ISP 
service, etc.).  
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both suppliers and end users have powerful economic incentives to remain compatible 
and connected with each other. Indeed, the deck is stacked so heavily in favor of an 
established root that if an alternate root achieves critical mass and threatens the 
dominance of the existing root, it can only happen because the existing root is doing 
something seriously wrong. ICANN itself claims to be based on an “Internet community 
consensus.” If so, it has nothing to fear from competing roots, because – given the 
importance of network externalities in this market – a sustainable alternate root could 
only arise from a clear lack of consensus support for ICANN policies among a critical 
mass of suppliers and consumers.  
 
A more difficult and complex issue to be faced is how much interconnection should be 
implemented between a dominant root and alternate systems. If ICANN continues to 
stifle the market for new top-level domains, this issue will have to be faced. In this paper, 
I sketch out some of the issues involved in interconnecting roots, but do not make any 
detailed or specific proposals. 
2. The DNS Name space 
The DNS is a distributed database protocol that allows end users around the world to 
coordinate the assignment of unique names to computers. The protocol also coordinates 
the translation of those names into the numerical IP addresses that guide the movement of 
packets across the Internet.  
 
The DNS name space is a hierarchy. (Figure 1) At the top of the hierarchy is an unnamed 
root. The root is defined by the contents of the root zone file, a list of top-level domain 
name assignments with pointers to primary and secondary name servers for each top-
level domain. Currently, the root server system consists of 13 name servers placed in 
various parts of the world. The server where the root zone file is first loaded is considered 
authoritative; the others merely copy its contents. The additional servers make the root 
zone file available more rapidly to spatially distributed users, and provide redundancy in 
case some root servers lose connectivity or crash.  
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Technically, the most important thing about the DNS root is that it provides a single, and 
therefore globally consistent, starting point for the resolution of domain names. As long 
as all the world's name servers reference the same data about the contents of the root 
zone, the picture of the name resolution hierarchy in one part of the world will continue 
to match closely the picture in any other part of the world. 
 
Aside from its technical significance, administration of the DNS root is important 
politically and economically. Whoever controls the root zone file also determines who is 
delegated authority over top-level domains. If top-level domain assignments are 
economically valuable, and many people believe that they are, then the decision about 
who gets one and who doesn’t gives the assignment authority a great deal of leverage 
over applicants. Monopoly control of top-level domain name assignments can thus 
provide the power needed to regulate registry policies, second-level domain name 
assignments and other aspects of Internet use. 
3. Competing Roots: Definition and Analysis 
Competition at the root level means competition for the right to define the contents of the 
root zone file. The root zone file is the list of recognized top-level domain (TLD) strings 
(such as COM, NET, ORG, DE, MX, etc.) with pointers to the IP addresses of the top-
level name servers capable of resolving names registered under that TLD. When 
implementing the DNS protocol, anyone with control over the configuration of a DNS 
client or name server has the ability to choose which root they query for resolution of 
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domain names.2 Competition, therefore, means that organizations compete to persuade 
Internet service providers, domain name server operators, and end users to direct root-
level DNS queries to them, so that their definition of the content of the root zone is 
recognized and accepted by the rest of the Internet. 
 
Competing roots are a form of standards competition. In standards competition, user 
choices are affected by the value of compatibility with other users, not just by the 
technical and economic features of the product or service itself. This feature of demand is 
called the network externality in economic jargon. The value of a system or service to its 
users tends to increase as other users adopt the same system or service. A more precise 
definition characterizes them as demand-side economies of scope that arise from the 
creation of complementary relationships among the components of a system. 
(Economides, 1996) Network externalities can be realized in one of two basic ways: 
either all users converge on a single system, or gateway technologies can be developed 
that interconnect the separate systems or make them compatible. 
 
There are many historical examples of competition based on compatibility, such as 
studies of competing railroad gauges (Friedlander, 1995), alternate electric power grid 
standards (Bunn and David, 1988), separate telegraph systems (Brock, 1981), non-
interconnected telephone networks (Mueller 1997), and alternate broadcast standards 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1992). All have shown that the need for compatibility among 
multiple users led to convergence on a single standard or network, or in interconnection 
arrangements among formerly separate systems. In some cases, political and economic 
factors can limit the scope of convergence (e.g., common broadcast standards were 
limited to world regions rather than becoming global in scope). Universal compatibility is 
not always necessary or desirable. 
 
However, in the case of DNS the need for unique domain name assignments and 
universal resolution of names creates strong network externalities in the selection of a 
DNS root. If all ISPs and users rely on the same public name space – the same delegation 
hierarchy – it is likely that all name assignments will be unique, and one can be 
reasonably confident that one’s domain name can be resolved by any name server in the 
world. Thus, a public name space is vastly more valuable as a tool for internetworking if 
all other users also rely on it, or coordinate with it. Network administrators thus have a 
strong tendency to converge on a single DNS root. 
 
Alternate roots face a serious chicken and egg problem. The domain name registrations 
they sell have little value to an individual user unless many other users utilize the same 
root zone file information to resolve names. But no one has much of an incentive to point 
at an alternate root zone when they have so few users. As long as other people don’t use 
the same root zone file, the names from an alternate root will be incompatible with other 
users’ implementation of DNS. That is, other users will be unable to resolve the name, 
making communication using that name impossible. 
 
                                                 
2 In actual practice, default values are set in the implementation software, which for 90% of the world’s 
computers is a software known as BIND.  
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Network externalities are really the only barrier to all-out competition over the right to 
define the root zone file. A root server system is just a name server at the top of the DNS 
hierarchy. There are hundreds of thousands of name servers being operated by various 
organizations on the Internet. In principle, any one of them could set up a public name 
space, assign top-level domain names to registries, and either resolve the names or point 
to other name servers that resolve them at lower levels of the hierarchy. The catch, 
however, is that names in an alternate space are not worth much unless a critical mass of 
name servers on the Internet recognize the alternate root and point their name servers at 
it. 
 
A major Internet industry player could quickly overcome the critical mass problem. An 
America Online, a Microsoft, a major ISP such as MCI WorldCom, all possess the 
economic and technical clout to establish a viable alternate DNS root should they choose 
to do so. If the producers of Internet browsers, for example, pre-configured their resolvers 
to point to a new root with an alternate root zone file that included or was compatible 
with the legacy root zone, millions of users could be switched to an alternate root. It is 
also possible that a national government with a large population that communicated 
predominantly with itself could establish an alternate root zone file and require, either 
through persuasion or regulation, national ISPs to point at it. Indeed, the Peoples 
Republic of China is offering new top-level domains based on Chinese characters on an 
experimental basis. The whole transition to multilingual names is creating numerous 
opportunities for establishing alternate roots.  
Compatibility Structures of Competing Roots 
The debate over competing roots can be further clarified by modeling various structures 
that competition might take and their impact on end user compatibility. If there are two 
DNS roots – say, the ICANN-Department of Commerce-managed root (Root I) and a 
competing root (Root C) – competition can take one of three forms [Auerbach, 2000]: 
 
• Type 1: The zone files of Root-I and Root-C have identical contents due to 
mutual recognition and coordination. 
• Type 2: Root-C has more top-level domains than does Root-I but for those 
TLDs in common, the contents of the root zone are identical. 
• Type 3: Root-C and Root-I contain at least one, and possibly many more, 
conflicting assignments of top-level domains. In other words, each root 
administrator has assigned the same top-level character string, but to different 
organizations. The name servers operated by those organizations contain 
different zone file contents for the top-level domain in question; i.e., they 
resolve to different IP addresses. 
 
In Type 1 competition, the identical content of the root zone file is achieved through 
coordination. That is, Root-I agrees to recognize and name serve top-level domains 
created by Root-C, and vice versa. Both roots agree to avoid making top-level 
assignments that conflict with TLDs in the other root. The economic effect is identical to 
an interconnection agreement in telecommunications. The method of coordination can be 
either social-institutional in nature (e.g., meetings and procedures for assigning names 
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and resolving conflicting claims) or technical (i.e., some kind of protocol that keeps 
assignments within the roots consistent, or adds information to inconsistent assignments 
to make them unique).  
 
In Type 2 competition, the competing root adds capabilities (new TLDs) that do not exist 
in the other root. This is the form of competing roots that we are now experiencing. 
New.net, ORSC, and other alternate roots all carry the ICANN root zone and do not make 
assignments that conflict with it. They add new TLDs to the content of the ICANN root 
zone. This method of competition preserves universal compatibility in all the existing 
domains, and for all users of Root C, but creates incompatibility for users of Root I. 
Users of Root-I will not be able to resolve names that are unique to Root-C. For example, 
if Root C adds a top-level domain “.new” to its root, its own customers will be able to 
fully utilize domain names ending in .new, as well as all the Root-I top-level domains. 
But users of Root-I will not be able to resolve domain names ending in .new. The 
compatibility relationships look like this: 
 
Table 1: Type 2 Competition – Compatibility Relations 
 
 Origin of domain name query 
Origin of domain name 
assignment 
 
Users of Root-I 
 
Users of Root-C 
Root-I Compatible Compatible 
Root-C Incompatible Compatible 
 
In Type 3 competition (Table 2), the root zones are uncoordinated. No user of either root 
can be sure that they have a unique domain name. Users have a high risk of experiencing 
incompatibility when they interact with each other (unless of course they all converge on 
the same root). There are very powerful economic incentives limiting the possibility of 
such a scenario. Over the medium and long terms, it is difficult to understand why 
customers would continue to buy, or how suppliers could sustain a business selling, 
domain names that did not work a significant amount of time, and were perpetually at 
risk of being incompatible with a significant portion of the Internet. Both ISPs and their 
customers have very strong incentives to maximize compatibility, and could be expected 
to converge on a common root or to coordinate the alternate roots. 
 
Table 2: Type 3 Competition – Compatibility Relations 
 
 Origin of domain name query 
Origin of domain name 
assignment 
 
Users of Root-I 
 
Users of Root-C 
Root-I Compatible Incompatible 
Root-C Incompatible Compatible 
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Policy Issues 
The three types of root competition enumerated above are useful categories for analyzing 
the policy issues regarding competing DNS roots. 
 
While Type 1 (interconnection or mutual recognition) might be optimal from the 
standpoint of the market participants’ ability to realize the benefits of network effects, it 
would severely undermine ICANN’s ability to impose public policy and regulation upon 
the domain name system. In effect, an interconnection agreement with an alternate root 
would give providers a way to operate new top-level domains without going through 
ICANN’s centralized contracting process. This would in turn provide end users with a 
choice of policies – if they did not like ICANN’s domain name dispute resolution policy, 
for example, registering a domain name in the alternate root system might provide a way 
to avoid it. In order to be able to impose policy obligations on DNS providers and users, 
ICANN must maintain the exclusivity of its root. Whether ICANN’s capacity to enforce 
policy is something worth preserving of course depends on one’s opinion of ICANN and 
its policies. It may well be that both ICANN and the public would be well served by 
some competition that gave Internet users a choice of policies. But ICANN itself has no 
incentive to interconnect with an alternate root until and unless its number of users 
becomes too large to ignore. 
 
Even if ICANN was inclined to recognize the existence of an alternate root, it would still 
have to establish some thresholds and recognition criteria. It is easy to establish an 
alternate root with new TLDs if one needn’t worry about having real customers. 
Moreover, indiscriminate recognition of any alternate root that came along would simply 
encourage new alternate roots to stake indiscriminate claims on top-level domain strings. 
Some kind of criteria for distinguishing between “real” and “unreal” or “serious” and 
“silly” alternate roots would have to be established.  
 
A policy white paper put forward by New.net proposes a general solution to this problem. 
[New.net, 2001, p. 4-5] It analogizes the addition of new TLDs to the root to the decision 
by local cable television operators to add programming channels to their menu of 
offerings. A new TLD would seek to gain support among ISPs and users in a similar way. 
As an alternative to ICANN’s highly political and slow TLD-licensing process, New.net 
proposes that ICANN encourage private companies to develop top-level domains in the 
market and set some minimal technical standards and a “minimum number of domain 
names being used by disparate users.” When those thresholds are met the TLD is added 
to the public root. One problem with this approach is that it would not easily allow for the 
creation of TLDs oriented toward private companies that wanted to internalize their DNS 
service (e.g., a .aol or a .ford), or TLDs that served relatively small communities of users 
(e.g., there are less than 100 registrants in .int) 
 
Some analysts have argued that competing roots have the potential to “seriously disrupt 
the Internet” because of the dissemination of inconsistent data throughout the DNS 
[Lynn, 2001; Crispin, 2001]. That argument, however, applies only to Type 3 
competition; i.e., when there is no coordination among the separate roots’ name 
assignments whatsoever and numerous conflicting TLD assignments exist. Type 2 
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competition does not create such problems, because it retains the consistency of all 
assignments under TLDs in Root-I, and simply adds new, non-conflicting TLDs to the 
Root-C zone file. The deliberately deceptive equation of Type 3 and Type 2 competition 
is one of the more egregious rhetorical tactics used in the DNS wars. 
 
The real policy issue in Type 2 competition comes when the dominant root wants to add 
new TLDs. At that point it must decide whether or not to assign top-level domains that 
collide with (i.e., duplicate) those already assigned by the alternate root. For example, if 
ICANN ever decides to add new top-level domains, it will find that the .hola string is 
already in use by many customers of New.net. If ICANN avoids assigning .hola to any 
registry licensed through its own process for that reason, it is tacitly recognizing New.net, 
a kind of halfway house toward a Type 1 situation. Of course, avoidance of conflicting 
assignments is not the same as mutual recognition and coordination – the alternate root’s 
TLDs still would not be listed in the ICANN root zone files. But conflict-avoidance 
would constrain ICANN’s choices of TLD strings, and make it easier for the competing 
root to survive. 
 
On the other hand, if ICANN assigns TLDs already in public use by another root, it is 
initiating Type 3 competition. The effect is to create bilateral incompatibilities in the 
market for domain names. Because of the powerful network externalities, end user 
reaction to those incompatibilities would in most cases tip the market toward one of the 
competing roots (in this case, probably the dominant one). For example, if ICANN chose 
to assign .hola to someone other than New.net, it could transform all holders of 
New.net’s .hola names into “orphans” and render worthless their prior investments in the 
names.3 Such an exercise of market power by the dominant root (ICANN) raises a serious 
competition policy issue. If it was not illegal for New.net to enter the market in the first 
place, should it be legal for ICANN to use its dominance of the DNS root-server system 
to put them out of business? In this scenario, it is important to note that it would be 
ICANN, rather than New.net, that initiated the incompatibility.  
 
One suggestion for resolving such conflicts is that a right of first use be recognized, 
similar to the establishment of rights over trademarks. Here again, workable criteria and 
thresholds must be established. 
  
One option that does not seem feasible is to make alternative roots illegal. Any attempt to 
require all users to point to an “authoritative” root raises a number of serious policy 
problems. First, it violates a foundational principle of the Internet, which is that the 
Internet is a collection of private networks that choose to interconnect (or not) with each 
other. Second, such “authority” to be effective would have to be global and legally 
enforceable, which means that it would have to come from an international agreement 
among governments. Furthermore, any attempt to designate and make mandatory an 
authoritative root would risk freezing Internet naming technology in its tracks. It would 
not be easy or unambiguous to define what “pointing to the authoritative root” means in 
legal terms; such a definition would have to careful not to outlaw technologies that might 
                                                 
3 (By the same token, if New.net were well-established enough and had lots of functional registrations 
under .hola, it is possible that the ICANN delegee could fail to attract customers because of the conflict.) 
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enhance the DNS, such as content distribution networks, keyword systems, or private 
name spaces. Nor would it be wise to attempt to prohibit efforts to bypass DNS altogether 
with a radical new naming or addressing technology.  
4. The Internet Architecture Board on Competing Roots 
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) describes itself as a “technical advisory group” of 
the Internet Society. It is a largely self-selected committee of 13 people, 6 of whom are 
nominated by a committee drawn from the Internet Engineering Task Force (these 
nominations must be approved by the Internet Society Board of Trustees), and another 6 
basically recruited and selected by existing IAB members. The Chair of the IETF is an 
ex-officio member the IAB. Its meetings are also attended by the ICANN employee who 
performs the so-called Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) function. Because 
of their roots in the old DARPA-funded Internet technical community, IAB has very 
close ties to ICANN. 
 
RFC 2826, The Internet Architecture Board’s “Technical Comment on the Unique DNS 
Root,” [IAB, 2000] is often cited in the policy debates over alternate roots as if it were 
the last word on the subject. According to RFC 2826, the DNS protocol was designed 
with the assumption that there would be only one authoritative root zone file. The 
statement goes on to describe some of the compatibility problems that might occur if 
computers attempting to resolve domain names are confused about the contents of the 
root zone file. The fundamental conclusion of RFC 2826 is this: 
  
…a degree of cooperation and agreed technical rules are required in order to 
guarantee the uniqueness of names. In the DNS, these rules are established 
independently for each part of the naming hierarchy, and the root domain is no 
exception. Thus, there must be a generally agreed single set of rules for [assigning 
the top-level domain names listed in] the root. 
 
The statement is useful as a description of one of the original design parameters of the 
DNS. But RFC 2826 provides no guidance as to how to resolve the policy issues posed 
by the existence of competing or multiple roots.  
Alternate Roots Exist 
The IAB statement was first issued in 1999 and became an “official” RFC in 2000. The 
document emerged from the heated policy controversies surrounding the early days of 
ICANN. While labeled a “technical comment,” the document is most commonly cited in 
policy debates concerning competing roots, and tends to be used by ICANN and IETF as 
a technical “proof” that certain policies regarding the DNS root are undesirable. 
 
In straining to clothe policy conclusions in the garb of technical expertise, however, the 
statement sacrifices precision. It states “it is not technically feasible for there to be more 
than one root in the public DNS.” It is a rather strange claim. There are different root 
server systems in operation. These alternate root systems use the same DNS protocol and 
the same software implementation (BIND) as the ICANN root servers. Most, if not all, of 
them are capable of resolving all names under the IANA-delegated top-level domains. So 
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it cannot be argued that they are not an implementation of the Domain Name System 
protocol. Nor it is technically correct to say that they are “private” rather than “public” 
name spaces. All of the alternate root systems are open to any ISP or end user who 
wishes to point resolvers or name servers in their direction. 
 
Even if alternate roots did not exist now, nothing in the DNS protocol prevents a subset 
of the world’s Internet service providers or end users from redirecting their name servers 
to some place other than the ICANN-administered root, if they wished to do so, at any 
time. The technical specifications for the DNS protocol do not say who administers the 
root, or name the IP addresses of root servers. Taken literally, the IAB statement is 
wrong: it is possible to have “more than one root in the public DNS.” Indeed, it would be 
just as accurate for the technical comment to note that “nothing in the original design of 
DNS prevents the world’s name server operators from disagreeing about who is or should 
be the authoritative root.”  
 
All the IAB is really capable of saying is that multiple roots may lead to compatibility 
problems in resolving names, as described under Type 2) and 3) competition above. But 
whether the value added by competing roots is worth the price of that incompatibility is a 
policy and economics question, not a technical issue.  
 
More fundamentally, RFC 2826 provides no guidance as to how to respond to the 
compatibility problems posed by alternate roots once they exist. Should competing roots 
interconnect with each other? Should an incumbent root recognize the TLD assignments 
made by alternate roots and avoid adding new TLDs that conflict with them? Or should it 
maintain exclusivity and actively conflict with a competing root in order to drive it out of 
business? These are the real policy issues posed by root competition, and the IAB 
statement simply does not deal with them. Indeed, in many ways RFC 2826’s insistence 
on the singularity of the root has become an obstacle to rational discussion of the 
problem. 
RFC 2826 and DNS Policy 
RFC 2826 confuses three distinct questions: 1) the factual issue of whether multiple roots 
can possibly exist; 2) the normative questions whether alternate roots should exist; i.e., 
whether the risks and costs of incompatibility are less desirable than the value created; 
and 3) the practical question of what is the appropriate policy response to alternate roots, 
once they do exist and a normative determination has been made.  
 
If one believes that alternate roots should not exist, one must come up with concrete, 
feasible, and legal proposals to preserve the singularity of the root, and one must deal 
with a variety of socio-economic tradeoffs. One does not, for example, contribute much 
to crime control policy by repeatedly asserting that “crime is bad” or that “crime should 
not exist.” An effective crime prevention policy must recognize the existence of crime 
and identify specific measures to reduce or eliminate it. Those measures must balance the 
goal of crime prevention against other social values, such as privacy, individual rights, 
and budget constraints. 
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Assuming one accepts the basic premise of RFC 2826 that the root should be 
coordinated, and one accepts the fact that alternate roots can and do exist, one can 
identify several different policy options that might be advanced to achieve coordination: 
 
• ICANN could agree to coordinate its top-level domain assignments with those of 
alternate roots, by adding their TLDs to its root zone (i.e., move to Type 1 
competition) 
• The ICANN root could ignore alternate roots, but avoid assigning TLDs that 
conflicted with TLDs in alternate roots 
• ICANN could assume that the alternate roots have no right to exist and assign 
TLDs that conflicted with TLDs in alternate roots in an attempt to drive them out 
of existence 
• The backers of ICANN could seek legislation to ban alternate roots, or redefine 
the DNS protocols in ways that rendered any alternate root incompatible with the 
ICANN root. 
• ICANN could set thresholds that determined when a TLD from another root 
would be entered into its own root, or fix some other algorithm determining its 
relationship with them. 
 
RFC 2826 provides no guidance as to which of these options is best. Nor should it; the 
IAB’s expertise is in protocols and Internet architecture, not public policy.  
 
In sum, RFC 2826’s statement that “there must be a generally agreed single set of rules 
for the root” is merely the starting point for policy discussion. The assertion is both 
uncontroversial and not dispositive of the policy options available. Advocates of a “single 
authoritative root” need to face the reality that portions of the Internet community can 
and are defecting from or supplementing the ICANN root. Asserting that a particular root 
server system “should be” authoritative and singular does not make it so. One can agree 
on the need for coordination at the root level without necessarily agreeing that ICANN is 
the sole or proper source of those rules. Nor does the general need for a single set of rules 
eliminate the legitimacy and benefit of debate over what those rules should be. 
5. What Sustains Alternate Roots? 
The Internet technical community tends to view competing or alternative roots as a form 
of heresy. Those who advocate it are dismissed as anarchic troublemakers who want to 
undermine order for its own sake, or as confused people who don’t understand DNS 
technology. 
 
There is a simpler and more accurate explanation for the existence of alternate roots. 
Alternate roots arise primarily for economic reasons. They reflect a serious 
disequilibrium between the demand for new top-level domain names and the willingness 
of the root administrator to supply them. That conclusion is supported by an analysis of 
the historical origin and recent growth of alternate root efforts, and from the specific form 
that root-competition has taken. 
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The Rise and Fall and Rise of Alt.Roots 
The first organized effort to form an alternate DNS root emerged in 1996. This occurred 
shortly after Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) began charging $50 per year for domain name 
registrations. It quickly became clear that in the environment of explosive growth created 
by the rise of the World Wide Web, domain name registration in generic top-level 
domains could be a lucrative business.  
 
The Internet community, still organized informally around US Government-funded 
education and research networking initiatives, tried to coordinate efforts to create many 
new top-level domains in late 1995. There was widespread agreement that competition 
with Network Solutions was necessary and desirable. These efforts, loosely presided over 
by the late Jon Postel, produced an Internet draft proposing to create hundreds of new 
top-level domains. [Postel, 1996]. In anticipation of the award of new TLDs, some 
entrepreneurs, such as Eugene Kashpureff, Karl Denniger, Chris Ambler and Simon 
Higgs, began to operate “experimental” registries in 1996. Based on first occupation and 
use, they asserted exclusive claims on particular TLD strings, such as .biz, .web. or .news. 
Rancorous differences emerged, however, between these entrepreneurs and the traditional 
DARPA and NSF-funded Internet engineers led by Postel. The disagreements centered 
on the payment of fees for TLDs and the legitimacy of the decision making process. 
Other interests, notably the ITU and the trademark interests, also began to question the 
legitimacy of Postel’s plan. Impatient with the delays and confusion surrounding the 
introduction of new TLDs, the entrepreneurs began to operate what they called “alternate 
roots” and to explicitly and publicly challenge the need for a single, authoritative root run 
by Postel. In 1997 another entrepreneur, Paul Garrin, set up an alternate name space with 
hundreds of generic top-level names (known as Name.Space) to promote the concept of 
non-exclusive generic TLDs. In this, the first round of root competition, the motivation 
for root-competition was the public’s interest in registering names under more descriptive 
TLDs, and the inability of the Internet community to respond in a timely fashion to that 
market demand.  
 
The alternate roots failed to achieve critical mass, however. The inherent handicap 
created by network effects, their lack of financing and sound business practices, and their 
inability to work together – symbolized most dramatically by the breakup of the eDNS 
coalition – led to their marginalization. The creation of ICANN from mid-1997 to the end 
of 1998 diverted attention from alternate roots even more, as those who wanted to operate 
or use new TLDs hoped that either the US Government’s NTIA or the new private 
governance entity would formally authorize them. By the middle of the year 2000, only 
an estimated 0.3% of the world’s name servers pointed to alternate roots. (Baptista, 2000) 
 
However, ICANN’s efforts to create new top-level domains took a long time. ICANN did 
not solicit bids for new TLDs until August of 2000, nearly two years after its creation. It 
required bidders for new TLDs to provide a $50,000 non-refundable fee to finance its 
evaluation and implementation. (Ironically, Postel’s controversial 1996 proposal would 
have charged only $10,000 to successful registry applicants, yet led to the protests that 
sparked the first alternate root movement. ICANN was proposing to make organizations 
pay five times as much just to be considered.) Despite the slow pace and the costly 
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application process, ICANN received applications from 43 different organizations 
seeking nearly 300 top-level names. Some of the bidders were operators of alternate 
roots, including Ambler’s .web registry, and Paul Garrin’s Name.space. 
 
In November 2000, ICANN finally authorized only seven new top-level domains. Only 
three of the new ones (.biz, .info, and .name) were targeted at larger commercial markets. 
The rest were sponsored or restricted domains targeted at specific communities, such as 
museums, cooperatives, and the airline industry. The successful bidders, moreover, were 
almost all closely tied to ICANN or the Internet Society. Network Solutions, which 
already controlled .com, .org and .net, and Register.com, the second-largest registrar after 
Network Solutions, formed a consortium called Afilias with several other registrars to 
successfully bid for .info. Register.com also received the TLD .pro. CORE, a group of 
registrars that played a major political role in supporting and creating ICANN, received 
the contract for operating the .museum TLD and was also a member of the Afilias group. 
Thus, not only was the number of new TLDs small, but the awards went to a very limited 
group of market participants, to the exclusion of many viable new entrants. 
 
An important and interesting aspect of ICANN’s new TLD decision involved its 
relationship to some of the remaining alternate root operators. The Afilias consortium’s 
first choice for a TLD was .web. At the November meeting, Board member Vinton Cerf 
opposed awarding .web to the Afilias consortium, explicitly acknowledging Image Online 
Design’s prior claim and use of the .web TLD in an alternate root. Cerf’s motion was 
opposed by Board member Hans Kraijenbrink, who explicitly acknowledged the conflict 
and asserted that ICANN ought not to recognize any claims to TLDs that emerged from 
outside of its own process. In a tense and close vote, Cerf and the ICANN Board 
“liberals” prevailed over the conservatives. Afilias was awarded .info instead of .web, and 
IOD was encouraged to wait for the second round.4 On the other hand, one of the other 
successful bidders, a joint venture between Melbourne IT and NeuStar, applied to operate 
the .biz top-level domain. Biz was one of the original top-level domains operated by 
alternate root leader Karl Denninger in 1996. Denninger abandoned the TLD in 1998, but 
in the Spring of 2000, well before ICANN’s call for bids, a businesswoman named Leah 
Gallegos took over the .biz domain and began operating it from within an alternate root 
system. [Gallegos, 2001] Unlike the .web case, Gallegos’s prior claim was not recognized 
by ICANN, and .biz was awarded to the NeuStar/Melbourne IT joint venture. 
 
ICANN’s long-awaited decision on new TLDs, then, had three key features from a policy 
and economic standpoint. First, it introduced a very small group of TLDs, despite the 
existence of viable applications for many more; second, it limited the choice awards to a 
small group of businesses that were already privileged players in ICANN’s process; third, 
it sent out mixed signals about the relationship between the ICANN root and competing 
roots. In the .web decision, it avoided conflict with an alternate root; in the .biz decision, 
it did not.  
                                                 
4 These conversations are recorded and available for public viewing on the Harvard Berkman Center’s web 
site. (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/scripts/rammaker.asp?s=cyber&dir=icann&file=icann-111600&start=6-
16-00) 
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Predictably, the artificial scarcity maintained by ICANN’s TLD awards reinvigorated the 
alternate root movement. In the Spring of 2001 New.net, a company backed by 
substantial amount of venture capital, created 20 new top-level domains. The 
entrepreneurs behind New.net were unsuccessful bidders in the first round of ICANN’s 
new top-level domain process. New.net’s challenge was joined by the .kids registry, 
another unsuccessful bidder in the first round. End users could use or see the New.net 
domains by installing a software plug-in to their browsers. New.net also formed alliances 
with mid-sized Internet service providers to support the new domains by operating an 
alternate root. New.net does seem to be coordinating with the Open Root Server 
Confederation (ORSC), but not with the Name.space alternate root system (which was 
incompatible with ORSC). 
 
This paper is being presented almost exactly a year since ICANN’s decision to authorize 
the 7 new top-level domains. Only two of them are operational now, and those two only 
began to accept “sunrise” or “landrush” registrations in late August. The other new TLD 
delegees are bogged down in difficult contractual negotiations with ICANN, and 
complain frequently of ICANN’s efforts to “micromanage” their affairs. Moreover, 
ICANN treated the rollout of new TLDs as an “experiment” that would be carefully 
studied and set no schedule for adding new top-level domains.  
 
In contrast, New.net has aggressively expanded the name space, adding many new names 
to its first batch of 20, including names in foreign languages. It is clear that to the extent 
there is a viable market for new top-level domain names, New.net is responding to it 
more quickly and efficiently than the ICANN process, despite the tremendous handicap 
of not being visible in the ICANN root. [New.net Policy Document, 2001]. 
 
In short, the rise and fall of alternate root activity tracks very closely the efforts of the 
established root to add new top-level domains. When the process of adding new TLDs to 
the incumbent root is stymied or in disarray, alternate roots grow. When there appears to 
be hope that the process will accept new TLDs, alternate roots wither.  
 
The relationship is clinched by the following facts:  
• Alternate root competition has invariably taken the form of Type 2 competition. 
That is, competitors have attempted to add new TLDs to the set supported by 
ICANN. None of them have made assignments that conflict with ICANN TLDs. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the primary motive of these efforts is to find a way to 
add TLDs to the available set. 
• Prior to the creation of ICANN, Name.Space repeatedly petitioned the US 
Government to enter its TLDs into the incumbent DNS root. Likewise, key 
backers of the alternate root movement were strong supporters of the US 
Government’s Green Paper, which advocated rapid addition of 5 new TLDs into 
the established root, obviously in the hopes that they would be selected for that 
privilege. 
• The major advocates and implementers of alternate roots – New.net, Image 
Online Design’s .web registry, and Name.Space – all applied for TLDs via the 
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ICANN process (and all were rebuffed). That is, all of them would strongly prefer 
to be visible in the ICANN root rather than attempting to establish an alternate 
root. 
 
Evidence suggests very strongl that competition in the root zone is fueled primarily by 
restrictions in the supply of new TLDs. 
Conclusion 
Why then does ICANN insist on maintaining artificial scarcity? The reason is rooted in 
the political constraints imposed on ICANN. As a corporatist “industry self-regulatory” 
body, ICANN represents a coalition of the Internet technical community, the intellectual 
property interests, incumbent registries, and a few major telecommunication and e-
commerce firms. Few of these groups have anything to gain from adding new tlds; many 
have a direct economic or political interest in preventing it. More fundamentally, tight 
regulation of access to the root provides the leverage for the imposition of regulatory 
policy on the domain name industry. If ICANN were truly a “technical coordinator,” as 
claimed by Ira Magaziner and the US Department of Commerce when it was created, it 
would passively accept and coordinate applications for new TLDs rather than actively 
restricting access and regulating their services and characteristics. Such a “thin ICANN” 
would be unable to impose on the DNS industry the kinds of trademark and market 
structure regulations that certain interests want. Nor would it provide the established 
technical hierarchy – the Jesuits of the Internet-Catholic faction – the degree of power 
over the Internet’s technical evolution that they desire. 
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Appendix: Time Line of ICANN’s encounter with 
competing root policy 
November 2000  
The ICANN Board authorizes 7 new TLDs. At that meeting, Board member Vinton Cerf 
opposes awarding the TLD string .web to the Afilias consortium, explicitly 
acknowledging Image Online Design’s prior claim and use of the .web TLD in an 
alternate root. Biz assignment is made to Neulevel/Melbourne IT joint venture, despite 
prior claim of a small alternate root operator. 
February 2001 
At US Congressional hearings, ICANN is grilled about its new TLD process. Vint Cerf 
defends the small number and apparently arbitrary selection process by claiming that the 
new TLDs were part of a “proof of concept” designed to test the feasibility of various 
types of new domains and admits that many viable proposals were not selected. Leah 
Gallegos, proprietor of the .biz top-level domain in the alternate root systems, testifies 
that she is being driven out of business by ICANN. 
March 2001  
New.net, a company formed by a losing applicant in ICANN’s new TLD lottery, along 
with another losing applicant, .kids, announce the creation of 20 new top-level domains 
supported by both a browser plug-in and an alternate root.  
April 2001  
The DNSO General Assembly Chair calls for discussions of TLD name collisions, 
referring specifically to the .biz decision. The General Assembly also forms an email 
discussion list devoted to the topic of alternate roots. 
May 9 2001  
The Names Council of the DNSO forms a Task Force on Multiple Roots and begins to 
assemble a “briefing paper” on the issues for discussion in Stockholm. Council is split on 
whether to form an open working group to take up the issue, or to avoid the issue. 
May 28 2001 
ICANN CEO Stuart Lynn posts a “discussion draft” announcing that ICANN supports a 
“single, authoritative root.” The document attacks the legitimacy and “insular” motives of 
the promoters of alternate roots. 
May 2001 
For a brief period the US Federal Trade Commission posts a document on its web site 
warning consumers against “unauthorized top-level domains.” The document is rumored 
to have been put there in response to pressure from the US Commerce Department and 
ICANN. A short time later, due to rumored lobbying pressure from New.net and Image 
Online Design, that language is removed from the document. 
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June 3, 2001 
At the Stockholm meeting, the DNSO Names Council votes 12-9 against forming a 
working group on the problem of multiple roots and instead requests “consultation” from 
the PSO and ASO. A few moments later it rescinds that vote and votes that “alternate 
roots are outside the scope of the DNSO.”  
June 4, 2001 
At the Stockholm meeting an open discussion of the Lynn draft is held before the Board. 
Supporters of the draft dominate the forum. At the meetings of the DNSO Business and 
ISP constituencies, New.net representatives receive harsh criticism. 
July 9, 2001 
A slightly revised Discussion draft is issued by ICANN as an official policy, “Internet 
Coordination Policy #3.” The policy was never formally debated or approved by either 
the DNSO or the ICANN Board. ICANN President Lynn justifies this by asserting that 
the document “reaffirms existing policy” rather than creating a new one. 
August 2001 
Law professors and ICANNWatch editors Michael Froomkin and Jonathan Weinberg file 
a reconsideration request for ICP-3, arguing that ICP-3 bypassed DNSO’s allegedly 
bottom-up policy processes. ICP-3’s conclusions, they argue, “are not, even arguably, 
settled policy, ‘developed through previous ICANN processes or received by ICANN at 
its creation.’ Rather, they are new policies, announced in this document.” 
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